How does the sturtup mechanism work?
Let’s make it simple: you have an idea that can potentially be an innovative business case but not too much otherwise, if no one does what you want to do you probably won’t find any funder… You have to do something new but that doesn’t disrupt the rules of the game too much…You go begging inside different incubators, different hubsss that gather investors who are willing to “invest” their money. “Submit” your idea, or part of it, to apply for European or state funds.
The point is that you have to be good enough to persuade the system (either investors or employers of funds) to give you money to develop your genius idea (we emphasize the belief, i.e., the action of se-ducing toward the idea where the form is the essential). That is how, in a very rough way, the architecture of sturtup companies in the West works (sometimes there are alternative routes that avoid external funds, at least initially, and the entrepreneur puts his money in first and patents the basis of his idea and then seeks funds to finance the work, as usual we talk about trends and not individual cases, we know very well that each case can be different from the statistic, it is called statistics in fact). So sturtuppers have to persuade in order to get funds, they don’t already start by solving a problem to validate the idea, they persuade others, based on ideas, emotions and plans on paper. What does this mechanism tell us? That most sturtups don’t actually solve any problems and that the funds are wasted money; it might even be acceptable when they are private funds (business angels or whoever who decide to invest in the sturtupist asshole) but the problem arises when those investment funds are managed by third-party entities, who don’t own the money, but use that of the banks (i.e., unaware savers who invested in something eventually reassured by the bank). They act as faggots with other people’s asses, as they say in technical jargon, without risking their own money and with the social label “research funds,” “development funds,” “digitization funds” …etc…made the label taken the screwing (the taxpayer takes it without knowing precisely, in fact he smiles because the sound of the words describing the funds is reassuring).
Macroscopically: if the phenomenon were limited to small scales and “normal” companies and industries were functioning in a healthy way, there would not be too many problems, after all (considering that the strategic base industry continues to function, we could consider that the country’s wealth is secured by the latter) but what is happening is that the strategic base companies are quietly shutting down. They are being taken for granted, they have downsized the basis by investing everything on an uncertain future (uncertain by definition which is the sturtuppist system that is well known to have a failure rate around 90 percent), without among other things investing on low-cost energy forms. It is as if from one day to the next a tree decides to take all its nourishment only from the leaves neglecting the roots, at the first flutter the tree falls down.
It is also interesting to observe how the creation of new companies works compared to the past: before one was doing X job, he gets an idea of how to solve Y problem found in X job and sets up his own business by making his own company starting from the garage. Or just by solving a new problem: we can easily think of the titans (today) of Silicon Valley or the car makers of the 1920s etc.
The fact is: there is a need, I pick up on it and create something that is usable immediately and maintain my company with the money I make from the sale: directly and immediately.
The spoiled methodology of the sturtups, on the other hand, like parasites, is hooked on the handout mechanism and sucks the vulgar nectar for years and years without really creating added value or being able to sustain themselves with their sales. They create an expectation, pre-orders, demands that justify the demand for those funds, plus if they become large enough to hire a considerable number of employees they are able to have blackmail power toward the money giver that is proportional to that number of employees (we can think of Northvolt as Lilium). This methodology of doing “enterprise” is fallacious and extremely detrimental in the long run because, in addition to weakening the roots of the nation/state system, as it tends not to invest on strategic core industry, it has very low efficiency of success and rarely creates added value. So what happens is that: time is lost (actually money is time and not viceversa, who has more money has more time. Time is the only real one resource).
In fact, let us ask the added value of a factory of “batteries” for electric cars: the car already exists, and it makes it possible to get from A to B cost-effectively. If the development of an electric car battery doubles the cost of getting from A to B but I still need to get from A to B, there is no added value to justify that cost increase. Or rather, the added value would be that of not producing carcinogenic particulate matter in the cities and, up to there, it might even fit but if then the electricity either costs 10 times more if made from renewable sources or costs the same but is produced from non-renewable sources you have only shifted the problem twice…and that especially to the user of the electric car who cannot afford to pay 30% more for a vehicle to perform the same task (going from A to B).The economically (ECONOMICALLY) justifiable added value would be effective if the cost of the electric vehicle was half (to say) of the thermal ones or if it could go the A-B route in half the time for the same cost and so on.
OR have a better PERFORMACE!!!!! If an engineered system costs more and has lower performance it is crap.
In the case of electric mobility, the costs of developing certain technologies should not be passed on to the companies first and then to the taxpayer (who needs the car to get from A to B) but the strategy should be changed so as to identify the most burdensome sources of pollution (road transport and public road transport) and act accordingly by contracting out electric buses to companies that already have experience on similar systems while trying to minimize the direct cost on taxpayers.
If the technology then works it will pay for itself. If, on the other hand, it does not work, there is no point in pursuing it solely out of ideological will.The aim must be adjusted, precisely, by upgrading the national electricity infrastructure with the substantial addition of nuclear.
Performance and value added are key to an investment, if something works better than another it will pay for itself in a short time, if it takes a very long time there can be no investment (also because boundary conditions often change and in the long run it is difficult to identify a gain clearly, except by looking at a country’s growth a posteriori). From this perspective, the very poor growth of Euroba is the effect of low ROI investments, and the sturtups, in the Eurobean stage (Downward Euroba), are the symptom of this disease.